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The rise of Britain’s super-indies: 
Policy making in the age of the global media market  
 
Abstract 
This article analyses Britain’s remarkable performance in the European television 
industry. In the space of a few years the UK has risen to become the world’s 
leading exporter of TV formats and the world’s second exporter, behind the 
Unites States, of finished TV programmes. The first section compares and 
contrasts British TV exports data with that of France, before examining the 
emergence of London as Europe’s media hub. The second part argues that this 
significant progress is essentially due to deft policy making. In 2003, the British 
government operated a strategic shift in favour of content producers and created a 
new intellectual property regime. This regime has enabled producers to keep hold 
of their rights and become asset-owning businesses, eventually giving rise to a 
new breed of production companies: the super-indies. This paper shows how these 
super-indies have acquired the scale to compete in an international TV market and 
drive today’s British TV exports. Contrasting again Britain’s performance in the 
European TV trade with France, this article also analyses historical influences and 
claims it is Britain’s imperial past that helps her performance in the European TV 
marketplace. In addition to the globalization of the English language and the 
cultural affinities this nurtures, the trading heritage of the British Empire has 
facilitated Britain’s political elite’s understanding of the role that trade and the 
market can play in the creative industries, and enabled them to frame a 
broadcasting policy that is adapted to the global age.  
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The rise of Britain’s super-indies: 
Policy making in the age of the global media market  
 
Introduction 
It is not always recognized but Britain is the dominant power in Europe’s 
television industry: it is the world’s leading exporter of TV formats and is in 
second position for television programmes, behind the United States. British TV 
production companies are expanding fast on the international market, the 
country’s public broadcaster, the BBC, has unrivalled international and 
commercial clout among its peers, and London has become Europe’s regional 
media hub. 
Disparities amongst European nations have been overlooked in favour of 
imperatives of European integration, leading to an emphasis on the construction of 
a European communicative space. As phenomena such as the transnationalization 
of European television and the hypothetical construction of a European public 
sphere were discussed, the huge disparities amongst the cultural influence of 
nations were neglected (see Gripsrud, 2007; Schlesinger, 2007). 
The first section provides an overview of Britain’s performance in the world 
TV marketplace examining both British TV exports and the country’s top 
exporters. It compares this data with those from other countries, and then 
examines the emergence of London as Europe’s media hub. The second section 
seeks to understand how Britain has attained pre-eminence in European television. 
This paper argues that this improved performance is largely due to a policy 
decision in 2003 that re-balanced the relationship between broadcasters and their 
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suppliers, the independent TV producers. The new Code of Practice that came into 
effect the following year enabled these producers to keep all the content rights that 
are not explicitly purchased by broadcasters. This principle created a new 
intellectual property regime that turned rights into assets for independent 
production companies. These companies were then able to use their assets to 
develop and attract funding, the most ambitious among them acquiring, or 
merging with, other producers. It is the largest companies to emerge from this first 
round of consolidation – the so-called ‘super-indies’ – that have been expanding 
internationally lately, this paper shows. It also analyses sociological and historical 
influences and claims it is Britain’s imperial legacy that helps her performance in 
the European TV marketplace. In addition to the globalization of the English 
language and the cultural affinities it nurtures, the trading heritage of the British 
Empire has facilitated Britain’s political elite’s understanding of the importance of 
trade for the cultural industries, and enabled them to frame a broadcasting policy 
that is adapted to the global age.  
Throughout this paper, Britain’s role and performance in European television 
is compared to that of France. The comparison between the two nations reveals 
the influence of both policy and history in shaping these two countries’ 
contrasting position in today’s European television industry. This article is based 
on both primary and secondary sources, including numerous interviews with 
industry leaders.  
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British TV programmes and formats in the European TV marketplace 
This section analyses the performance of British television exports in the global 
TV market, distinguishing between finished programmes in genres such as factual 
entertainment and drama, and formats, which are shows that are licensed outside 
the UK in order to be adapted to local audiences (e.g. The Weakest Link, Who 
Wants to Be a Millionaire?). The first corpus of data is provided by two studies 
commissioned by PACT (Producers Alliance for Cinema and Television), the 
British trade association for independent producers and distributors, covering 45 
channels in eight countries.
1
 The 2007 study duplicated methodology first used in 
2003 but monitored a few more channels. It found that the UK’s share of finished 
programme exports (in terms of programming hours) in these eight countries 
stood at 7.5 per cent in 2007 (down from 8.7 per cent in 2003), whilst France’s 
share stood at 2 per cent (Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Total finished programme exports, 2003 – 2007. In percentages of programming hours 
Country of o 
Rigin 
USA UK 
 
Germany Canada 
 
France 
Year 2003 2007 2003 2007 2003 2007 2003 2007 2003 2007 
% of exported 
hours 
73 75 8.7 7.5 3.3 4.4 4.0 3.1 2.0 2.0 
Source: Television Research Partnership, 2008: 22. 
 
British television made up for a modest drop in exported finished 
programming with growth in the format trade. The practice of selling shows under 
licence to be adapted for local audiences became a multi-billion dollar industry in 
the late 1990s (Moran, 2006; 1998). Britain is the global leader in this trade and 
has consolidated its position over recent years. In terms of programming hours, 
more than half of all formats sold in the eight countries surveyed in the PACT 
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study originate from the UK, against 4 per cent from France (Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Total formats exports, 2003 – 2007. In percentages of programming hours 
Country of 
origin 
UK Netherlands 
 
USA France 
 
Argentina 
Year 2003 2007 2003 2007 2003 2007 2003 2007 2003 2007 
% of exported 
hours 
51.0 53.0 15.0 18.0 17.0 14.0 5.0 4.0 5.0 3.0 
Source: Television Research Partnership, 2008: 29. 
 
Another study established that only the UK, the Netherlands and the USA 
have a positive balance of trade in the format industry, with Britain exporting 
8,000 hours of formats more than it imports, and France importing about 4,000 
hours of formats more than it exports. The latter spent more than €500 million 
producing imported formats in 2005 (Bisson et al, 2005: 17-21). 
Many of the first ‘super-formats’ that went round the world at blazing speed 
originated in Britain: Celador’s Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?, Planet 24’s 
Survivor and, slightly later, Pearson Television’s and 19 TV’s Pop Idol 
(Bazalgette, 2005). Millionaire, in particular, was an astonishing commercial 
success, and it is the world’s most widely distributed format with 109 licences 
sold to this day (Spencer, 2008; Television Research Partnership, 2004: 26). 
Over the years, British independent production companies have had other 
notable successes across all genres, including Antiques Roadshow, Changing 
Rooms, Faking it, Gok’s Fashion Fix, Ground Force, Property Ladder, Ready 
Steady Cook, Secret Millionaire, Supernanny, Top of the Pops, What Not To 
Wear, and Wife Swap, to name but a few. British formats currently showing on 
European screens include All3Media’s Cash Cab, ITV Studios’s Come Dine With 
Me, Hell’s Kitchen and I’m a Celebrity… Get Me Out of here!, RDF’s Don’t 
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Forget the Lyrics, Shed Media’s Who Do You Think You Are?, Maverick TV’s 
How To Look Good Naked, BBC Worldwide’s The Weakest Link and Strictly 
Come Dancing (Dancing With the Stars), FremantleMedia’s Pop Idol, and the two 
hits that the latter company co-produces with Sony’s Syco TV, The X Factor and 
Got Talent.
2
 
By comparison, French formats are far and few between. Historically, 
France’s most successful format has been daytime game show Des Chiffres et Des 
Lettres (Countdown in the UK), but it ceased to perform well on the international 
market many years ago. In better shape is France Télévisions’s adventure game 
show Fort Boyard, currently in its 19
th
 season in France and still produced in five 
European territories.
3
 
Taking into account both formats and finished programmes (but excluding 
films), British programming represents 13.1 per cent of the hours exported to the 
eight countries surveyed by the PACT study, against 2.4 per cent for France (table 
3). This translates into 11,900 hours of programmes and formats for Britain, 
against 2,200 hours for France (Television Research Partnership, 2008: 9).  
 
Table 3: Total finished programme and formats exports, 2003 – 2007. In percentages of 
programming hours 
Country of 
origin 
USA UK 
 
Germany Canada 
 
France 
Year 2003 2007 2003 2007 2003 2007 2003 2007 2003 2007 
% of exported 
hours 
67.0 67.3 13.1 13.1 3.0 3.9 3.6 2.8 1.9 2.4 
Source: Television Research Partnership, 2008: 29. 
 
The number of broadcasting hours gives a first indication of British 
television’s performance on the global TV market, but the gap between France 
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and Britain gets even wider when financial revenues are taken into account. The 
price paid for programming varies according to territory, genre, and a show’s 
market appeal. Drama pays more than documentary and, for instance, the licence 
of Who Wants to Be a Millionaire? is many times more expensive than that of any 
other game show.  
Hollywood TV series have unmatched appeal at the top end of the market, but 
over the years quite a few British series have achieved considerable success in 
Europe, some of them attracting cult followings: The Avengers, The Prisoner, The 
Saint and The Champions in the 1960s were followed by series such as The 
Persuaders, Absolutely Fabulous, Dr Who, Inspector Morse, and The Office. 
British drama currently showing in Europe includes Skins (Canal Plus, France), 
Secret Diary of a Call Girl (M6, France), Doc Martin (ZDF, Germany), and 
Cranford (Ned 2, the Netherlands) (Esposito, 2008b; Fry, 2008). Britain’s most 
successful series ever is All3Media’s Midsomer Murders, currently in its 12th 
season in its home market and sold in over 200 territories (Pedersen, 2008). 
The broadcasting rights for these series and other desirable formats will cost 
considerably more than the less popular shows, and thus it comes as no surprise 
that a set of 2006 statistics shows that British companies exported almost eight 
times more than their French counterparts. Table 4 also reveals that France’s sales 
have expanded by only two percent since 2004, compared to 12.6 per cent for 
Britain (Table 4). This trend is supported by the PACT study, which states that 
‘overall […] estimates or revenues from UK TV exports show strong growth 
between 2003 and 2006’ (Television Research Partnership, 2008: 4). 
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Table 4: France v. Britain: TV programme exports by region, 2004 - 2006 
 France Britain 
 2004 2006 2004 2006 
 €millions €millions €millions €millions 
Europe 74.5 81.6 238.7 287.2 
Americas 18.9 16.5 347.7 368.0 
Rest of the world 14.8 16.9 185.7 214.2 
Total 108.2 115.0 772.1 869.4 
Source: Screen Digest, October 2007: 299. 
 
 
The rise of Britain’s super-indies 
Who drives British TV exports? Traditionally, it is vertically integrated 
broadcasters that have been Britain’s top exporters. BBC Worldwide, the 
Corporation’s commercial arm, has posted a series of strong results over recent 
years. In 2007/08, sales were up 13 per cent from the previous fiscal year to £916 
million (€1.08 billion, exchange rate 7 August 2009), and profit up 17 per cent to 
£118 million (€138.7 million) (BBC Worldwide, 2008: 2-3). Just under half of the 
revenue came from outside the UK, with three divisions (programmes, channels 
and formats) realizing £465.2 million of international sales between them (ibid: 
9). These figures place the BBC as Europe’s leading programme exporter and the 
world’s third largest format originating company.4 ITV, the UK’s leading 
commercial broadcaster, is another strong performer in the international TV 
market, its large catalogue of well-known dramas and entertainment shows 
stretching over five decades of television production. Its Global Content division, 
which sells programmes and formats in more than 200 territories, announced total 
revenue of £622 million for 2008 (ITV, 2009: 32). 
Today, however, these players are joined by a new breed of TV production 
company – the so-called ‘super-indies’ – that are rapidly developing a growing 
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presence on the global stage (Table 5). This section offers a brief profile of the 
leading super-indies before exploring their impact on the British TV production 
sector. 
 
Table 5: The leading super-indies 
Company Overall turnover 
(£m) 2008 
Overall turnover 
(£m) 2007 
Change (%) 
All3Media 230.0 202.5 +13.6 
Shine Group 216.0 146.0 +47.9 
IMG Media 207.5 221.7 -6.4 
Endemol UK 170.0 160.0 +6.3 
RDF Media 120.6 99.3 +21.5 
Tinopolis 68.0 66.0 +3.0 
Shed Media 63.0 71.8 -12.3 
DCD Media 34.0 42.0 -17.7 
Target 
Entertainment 
25.0 12.6 +98.4 
Source: Broadcast Supplement: The Annual Survey of the UK Independent TV Producers, 20 
March 2009: 5 
 
All3Media was launched in September 2003 and incorporated 16 companies 
from five different countries within its first few years. These include Bentley 
Productions, Cactus TV, Company Pictures, Lion Television, Lime Pictures, 
Maverick Television and North One Television in the UK, Idtv in the 
Netherlands, MME Entertainment in Germany, South Pacific Pictures in New 
Zealand and Lion Television in the USA.
5
 All3Media’s export catalogue spans 
most genres but is particularly strong in drama (Apparitions, Hollyoaks, Midsomer 
Murders, Skins, Wild At Heart) and factual entertainment (Bondi Rescue, Fifth 
Gear, The Rough Guide To… and Victorian Farm. Formats include Cash Cab 
(2,500 episodes produced in over 50 territories), Miss Naked Beauty and Top 
Trumps (Pedersen, 2008). 
The Shine Group, which was founded by Elisabeth Murdoch in 2001, hit the 
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acquisition trail after five years of organic growth. In 2006, the group acquired 
three prominent British production companies, Firefly, Kudos and Princess, 
before buying Reveille - the American company that was behind US versions of 
The Office and Ugly Betty - the following year. In 2009, Shine pursued its 
international expansion plans by establishing start-up companies in Germany, 
France and Australia, all staffed with experienced TV executives, and acquiring 
Sweden’s Metronome Film & Television. Metronome was the largest production 
group of the Nordic region with 15 companies across the region and in the USA. 
Today, Shine’s footprint spreads across nine territories, revealing the group’s 
ambition to join the elite club of global production giants (Daswani, 2009).
6
 
IMG Media, originally an American sports rights company founded in 1960 
and based in New York, has chosen London for its international headquarters. 
Present in over 30 countries, the group has expanded to sports and fashion events 
management, notably producing Fashion Week worldwide. In addition to IMG 
Sports Media, which produces about 6,000 hours of live sports television every 
year, the group owns three large UK production houses: Darlow Smithson 
(Seconds from Disaster, Touching the Void), Tiger Aspect (Mr Bean, Murphy’s 
Law, Charlie and Lola) and Tigress (Brazil, Everest), which all have a substantial 
portfolio of programmes sold across the world.
7
 
Endemol, the Dutch production company founded by Joop van den Ende and 
John de Mol in 1994, remains based in Hilversum, in the Netherlands, but Britain 
is the group’s main market and Endemol UK is a major force in British television. 
It incorporates Brighter Pictures (Big Brother UK and derived shows), Cheetah 
Television (Gok’s Fashion Fix; Deal or No Deal; Ready Steady Cook), Initial 
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(The One and Only…, Golden Balls), and Zeppotron (Would I Lie to You?). 
London has been an important creative hub for Endemol ever since Peter 
Bazalgette became chief creative officer in 2005, seven years after joining the 
company. Bazalgette left the group two years later following a take-over but the 
development teams of Endemol UK and USA have recently formed a creative 
partnership and meet regularly in order to brainstorm for global formats 
(Bazalgette, 2009; Parker, 2009; Tunstall, 2009; van Diepen, 2008; Endemol, 
2007). 
RDF Media Group was founded in 1993 by David Frank and made its first 
acquisition 12 years later with Touchpaper Television, a company specialising in 
drama. By the end of 2006, RDF had acquired five other independent production 
companies: IWC Media, Scotland’s leading TV production company, Radar, 
Presentable, The Foundation (children’s programming) and The Comedy Unit. 
RDF has had several international hits with shows like Wife Swap, Location, 
Location, Location, Don’t Forget the Lyrics, Faking It and Secret Millionaire 
(Millichip, 2008; RDF Media Group, 2008: 4). 
Tinopolis is Wales’s largest independent production company. Formed in 
1990 by Ron Jones, it established itself as a major programme supplier to S4C.
8
 It 
made a few acquisitions in the early 2000s (Fiction Factory and Salem Films), and 
floated on London Alternative Investment Market in January 2005, enabling it to 
purchase a London-based production company, Television Corporation. Tinopolis 
has kept two of its subsidiaries: Sunset + Vine, a TV sports production and 
distribution company, and Mentorn, a major producer of dramas (The Hamburg 
Cell), current affairs (Question Time), and factual and entertainment (The World’s 
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Worst…), with a Los Angeles division that produces reality and entertainment 
series for US networks (Paradise Hotel, Work Out, etc.). Other subsidiaries 
include POP1 (factual, children and arts), Folio, which specialises in police shows 
(Traffic Cops, Drunk & Dangerous, etc.), and Daybreak Pictures (drama).
9
 
Shed Productions was established in 1998 and acquired Ricochet in 
November 2005, followed by Wall to Wall and Twenty Twenty two years later. 
Shed Media – as the group was renamed - produces and distributes programming 
in a variety of genres, notably factual entertainment (Supernanny, Who Do You 
Think You Are?, World’s Strictest Parents), and prime time drama (Footballers’ 
Wives, Hope Springs, Waterloo Road). Shed Media’s in-house distribution arm, 
Outright Distribution, acquired in 2006, exploits the group’s intellectual property 
rights and distributes third party content in over 200 territories (Shed Media, 
2009; Bonney, 2008). 
These companies have emerged following a period of consolidation that has 
taken place in the UK independent TV production sector over recent years. This 
trend is unique in Europe because these groups have responded to incentives 
created by Britain’s regulatory environment (see below). Consolidation is 
altogether a sign of economic health for a sector that has long been under-
capitalized, and a promise of further growth. Development requires investment, 
and in order to attract funding from the City it is necessary to demonstrate a 
certain level of predictability and an ability to manage risk. Several companies 
clubbing together is a way of reducing risk (‘de-risking’ in management jargon) in 
an industry that remains unpredictable and where success can be elusive (Bonney, 
2008). 
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Super-indies are finally acquiring the scale that is necessary to successfully 
compete on the international market. Their catalogues, which combine material 
from several production companies, span all the key genres and have become 
diverse enough to interest large buyers. They have also developed multinational 
production capabilities and can create shows in the USA, notably. The financial 
rewards are higher than anywhere else in the world’s largest TV market, but the 
USA is also a global shop window for programming: a ratings success there is a 
sure way to boost a show’s worldwide sales. Many British formats, including 
Millionaire, Weakest Link and Pop Idol have become global phenomena after 
being picked by a US network (ABC, NBC and Fox respectively). In addition to 
format sales, the US version itself can be of interest to foreign broadcasters. Thus 
Shed Media with Supernanny, RDF with Wife Swap and FremantleMedia with 
Pop Idol not only filled their coffers by producing these shows in the United 
States, they then sold further licences around the world because of their success 
there, and went on to sell the US version to interested broadcasters (in 180 
territories in the case of American Idol) (Clark, 2008; Millichip, 2008). 
Alongside Shine and RDF, Shed has become one of the most successful 
super-indies in the United States. In 2008, 30 per cent of Shed’s revenue was 
generated by the American market. Significantly, for the first time this year, a 
higher proportion of the group’s gross profit came from the American market (30 
per cent) than the UK (26 per cent) (Shed Media, 2009: 5). Shed has an excellent 
track record of successfully exporting and producing British formats in the USA, 
starting with Supernanny in the mid-2000s (the American show is currently in its 
fifth series), World’s Strictest Parents and Who Do You Think You Are? The 
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genealogy series that searches family trees has recently signed up Hollywood stars 
including Sarah Jessica Parker and Lisa Kudrow, and has already attracted interest 
worldwide (Brzoznowski, 2009). Based on this performance, Shed Media US has 
won a prestigious commission from NBC, the American network, and is set to 
produce The Marriage Ref, a reality and comedy show devised by Jerry Seinfeld 
(Shepherd and Curtis, 2009). 
The super-indies also help foster an export culture in the independent 
television production sector. Most of them have developed a similar corporate 
structure, assembling several production companies with one outfit specializing in 
international sales and distribution such as All3Media International, DCD Rights 
(formerly NBD TV), RDF Rights, Shed’s Outright Distribution and ShineReveille 
International.  
These distribution arms enable super-indies to exploit their intellectual 
property and maximize the value of their rights. They also represent third party 
programmes and help independent producers to distribute their work on the 
international market. Small independent producers also receive market 
intelligence and advice from these distribution divisions, helping them to avoid 
basic mistakes.
10
 
 
London as Europe’s regional media hub 
Another significant development in British television is the role that London plays 
in the European broadcasting industry: it has become Europe’s undisputed 
regional media hub. An observer estimates that ‘[a]round 20% of the world’s 
global media operations are centred on London’ (Barrett, 2008: 23). Indeed, most 
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media companies with pan-European activities are based in London. 
All global media conglomerates have their regional headquarters in the 
British capital. It is the case of Disney (located in Hammersmith), Liberty Global 
(Fulham), NBC Universal, Sony Pictures Television International, Time Warner 
and Viacom (all in the West End). The head of News Corporation’s European 
operations, James Murdoch, is also based in the British capital. It is from London 
that these conglomerates run extensive pan-European TV networks such as 
Cartoon Network, Disney Channel or MTV (Chalaby, 2009). The exception is 
Bertelsmann’s RTL, based in Luxembourg, but its content division, 
FremantleMedia, is in London. 
Global TV news networks tell a similar story. CNN London is the network’s 
European headquarters, employing more than 130 staff. It is a major deployment 
base for correspondents across Europe. It is also the network’s largest production 
centre outside the USA, producing more than 50 hours of programming per 
week.
11
 Similarly, Al Jazeera English has three TV newsrooms outside Doha: 
Kuala Lumpur, Washington DC and London. Bloomberg Television and CNBC 
Europe are both located near the Square Mile, London’s financial district. 
The British capital houses many legal, financial and research companies that 
serve both the domestic and international television industry. It is also where the 
headquarters of many global advertising and communications groups are located. 
The advertising industry is dominated by a small number of holding companies, 
which are OmnicomGroup, WPP, Publicis and IPG (MediaWeek, 25 March 2008: 
4). Publicis is French and headed from Paris, but WPP is a British company based 
in Mayfair and both IPG and the OmnicomGroup are American corporations that 
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have their regional headquarters in London. Each of these holding companies 
encompasses a broad spectrum of activities covering public relations, direct 
marketing, new media and creative agencies. They also control media buying 
agencies, such as Omnicom’s OMD or WPP’s MediaCom, which specialize in 
buying and planning ad campaigns. These agencies are international networks in 
their own right and have offices around the globe. All these agencies, including 
Publicis’s ZenithOptimedia and Starcom MediaVest, have their European 
headquarters in London, which is where pan-European advertising accounts are 
held and pan-European campaigns are planned. Thus when multinationals such as 
Ikea, Nokia, Vodafone, Starbucks, Reckitt Benckiser, Toyota, Renault-Nissan or 
Zurich decide to consolidate their media account at European or global level, it is 
the London office that is responsible for coordinating the media buying and local 
advertising budgets (Reid, 2009; Durrani, 2008).  
 
 
Understanding Britain’s performance in the international TV market 
It is clear that Britain enjoys a prominent position in Europe’s television industry, 
both as the region’s leading TV programmes and formats exporter and a centre of 
power where decisions with transnational implications are made. How has the UK 
reached this position? This paper argues that in 2003 the British government 
implemented a policy shift in favour of content producers by creating a new 
intellectual property regime. This regime has enabled producers to keep hold of 
their rights and become asset-owning businesses, eventually reaching a scale 
necessary to thrive in the global TV market. Then, this section examines historical 
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influences and claims it is Britain’s imperial past that helps her performance in the 
European TV marketplace.  
 
Britain: The strategic shift towards content producers 
Britain was the first European nation to recognize the commercial value of its 
creative industries and shape its policies accordingly. Before the drive for export 
began in earnest, the government took a momentous policy decision in 1982: 
Channel 4 was set up as a ‘publisher-broadcaster’ and was required to commission 
its programming from independent producers (Ofcom, 2006: 34; see also 
Goodwin, 1998). The UK independent TV production sector was born, and was 
provided support by a strengthening of the commissioning culture over the years. 
The 1990 Broadcasting Act introduced ‘the statutory independent quota’ to other 
terrestrial broadcasters, stipulating that they must commission at least 25 per cent 
of their programming from independent producers (ibid.). The 1996 Broadcasting 
Act expanded the principle to digital terrestrial television channels (ibid.).  
When elected in May 1997 the New Labour government paid a close interest 
in the creative industries, first forming the Creative Industries Task Force, a forum 
for reflection that sought ‘ways of maximizing the sector’s economic potential’ 
(Steemers, 2004: 51). The government then mapped the creative economy, 
commissioned a few more studies, and published its Communications Bill, a draft 
media law, in May 2002 (Freedman, 2003).  
It is at this point that PACT, the independent producers’ and distributors’ 
trade body, noticed that the Bill failed to tackle a number of key issues and 
launched an epic and successful lobbying battle. It petitioned the Parliament 
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arguing that this legislative exercise would remain useless unless the Bill 
improved TV programming. Better quality could only be sustained by a healthy 
programme supply market yet, despite the policy initiatives taken by previous 
governments, it was in a state of terminal decline. PACT claimed that unless a 
radical change occurred in the basic relationship between buyers (i.e. 
broadcasters) and suppliers (i.e. independent producers), the supply side was 
effectively going bust. It contended that its members’ access to the UK market 
was restricted by too many exceptions in the quota system and denounced its 
‘cynical manipulation’ by broadcasters (PACT, 2002: 1). It also argued that the 
very small number of commissioning broadcasters (essentially the BBC, ITV, 
Channel 4 and Five) enabled them to negotiate the best possible terms of trade 
with independent producers. At one stage, PACT even compiled a dossier 
documenting the abuse that independent producers had received from a public 
broadcaster through strong arm tactics, price fixing and blackmailing (McVay, 
2009).  
Another point of contention was the issue of content rights: when a producer 
delivered a programme to a broadcaster, the latter could acquire all the rights 
attached to it ‘in perpertuity’ (PACT, 2002: 2). Broadcasters were able to obtain 
bundled and exclusive rights not only for the primary window (i.e. the terrestrial 
showing), but also for cable and satellite, overseas sales, and even the ancillary 
rights for licensing and merchandising. PACT argued that its members’ inability 
to protect their own intellectual property left the sector ‘weak commercially and 
heavily under-capitalised’ (ibid.).  
Members of the PACT Council, Eileen Gallagher and John McVay, PACT’s 
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Chief Executive, lobbied Members of Parliament, pursuing with particular vigour 
the powerful Joint Scrutiny Committee convened by Lord David Puttnam.
12
 This 
effort led to a call the then regulator, the Independent Television Commission 
(ITC), to launch a review of the programme supply market.  
The ITC concurred with PACT in its report, making several recommendations 
to redress the balance of power between terrestrial broadcasters and producers 
(Steemers, 2004: 67). In turn, ITC’s views were favourably received by the 
Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS), and in particular by Kim 
Howells, a junior minister. Howells recognized that independent producers had a 
strong case because of his previous experience working at the Department of 
Trade and Industry (DTT). He had seen at first hand a similar scenario in the case 
of the British supermarkets – a handful of dominant buyers behaving in a way that 
was detrimental to suppliers (the farmers). PACT looked at DTT’s approach to 
this issue and discovered that Howells had overseen a code of practice aimed at 
preventing supermarkets from abusing their dominant position. McVay went back 
to Howells and asked him to do the same for the independent TV production 
sector. Tessa Jowell, then Secretary of State at the DCMS, acquiesced and her 
department introduced 66 amendments to the Communications Act 2003, 
essentially giving PACT what it asked for (McVay, 2009). 
A Code of Practice was introduced at the beginning of 2004 that regulates the 
terms of trade between broadcasters and their suppliers (see below). Its core 
principle is the disaggregation of rights, enabling producers to keep all the rights 
that are not purchased by broadcasters. This includes all distribution rights 
(terrestrial, cable and satellite, Internet and international), and all ancillary rights, 
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which can be exploited via merchandising and licensing to create books, DVDs, 
mobile applications, Internet downloads, etc. In other words, ‘producers should 
retain rights in the programmes unless they are explicitly sold to a P[ublic] 
S[ervice] B[roadcaster] and/or other parties’ (PACT, 2008: 33).13 This principle 
created a new intellectual property (IP) regime which has not only transformed 
the fortunes of the independent production sector but opened up a new era in the 
history of British – and possibly European – broadcasting. 
The IP - the programmes and associated rights – that used to be controlled by 
broadcasters have now become the assets of independent producers. Since the 
City can now witness companies with creative people who own marketable IP, 
these assets enable producers to generate income and attract investment (either by 
floating the company on the stock market or finding private equity investors). In 
brief, this new IP regime has transformed small service companies that relied on 
hand-to-mouth feeding from commissioning broadcasters into fast-expanding 
businesses.  
From an analytical perspective, the Code contains three remarkable elements 
with the capacity to transform the broadcasting industry. Firstly, the Code does 
not attempt to constrain market forces; on the contrary, it reinforces – and even 
creates – a market for programming rights. Under the previous regime, this market 
was undermined by broadcasters abusing their dominant position in order to 
amass all the rights ‘in perpetuity’. The new regime re-calibrates the relationship 
between commissioners and suppliers, thereby creating a situation where 
broadcasters are forced to negotiate these rights in a transparent manner. 
Furthermore, if the Code sets the framework for negotiation of the terms of 
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trade, these terms are still settled by the market: it is up to broadcasters and 
suppliers to negotiate sales contracts. Thus, it is incorrect to claim that the Code 
favours one side over another. If producers do better in the current regime, it is 
because the Code has ended unfair commercial practices from a handful of 
dominant players. And it is also because, today as ever, producing content has 
more strategic value than merely distributing it. 
Secondly, this Code improves the programme supply market. The early 
dominance of broadcasters created a phenomenon of vertical integration in all but 
name. The current regime has created a clear separation between broadcasters and 
suppliers. By giving the latter more control over their production, it has revived 
the production sector and made it more attractive to supply content to 
broadcasters. Thus the Code has helped the supply side by enabling existing 
producers to grow, whilst attracting new entrants into the industry. On the other 
side of the coin, the sector has become more competitive, with hundreds of 
companies vying every day to come up with the best ideas. But a truly competitive 
supply side has many advantages, not least that of enhancing the quality of 
programming because it is healthy competition that drives creativity and 
innovation.  
Thirdly, the Code has an in-built mechanism that pushes producers to exploit 
their assets in as many ways as possible. John McVay had a clear idea of how he 
wanted the legislation to work: 
 
So we wanted to move away from the traditional European model, which is 
very inward-looking and often dominated by debates around subsidies and 
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cultural issues. We actually wanted to take a more entrepreneurial view of 
what the sector was for, what it could do. […] So what we wanted to do was 
arrive at arrangements which incentivised producers to become more 
international because a) they get growth, b) they become more diverse as 
businesses and c) ultimately content will become global (McVay, 2009). 
 
Thus it is apparent that when production companies retain the IP attached to 
their programmes, it is in their own interest to sweat their assets to the last drop. 
And indeed, among other things, the Code has transformed the distribution of fees 
attached to international rights. When the commissioning broadcaster had 
complete control over these rights (it would even appoint the distributor), it was 
due 70 per cent of gross revenues from any onward sale. It was thus able to deduct 
expenses and more often than not the production company would receive next to 
nothing. Under the new Code, the broadcaster’s share has been reduced to 15 per 
cent of net revenues of any show sold overseas. 
It is the globalization of the marketing horizon that has lead to the formation 
of super-indies and to their typical configuration of several production companies 
plus one distribution arm (see above). This has translated into a significant growth 
of the sector’s export revenue, which amounted to a total of £391 million in 2008, 
an 80 per cent increase on the 2004 figure of £215 million (Hurrell, 2009). 
The main beneficiary is of course the independent television production 
sector, but the volume of export has increased so much that it is said that Channel 
4 receives more money today from 15 per cent of net revenues than it previously 
did from 85 per cent. In the late 1990s, a sales executive reported that 
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‘international sales were always seen as the cherry on top of the cake’, but today, 
according to Louise Pedersen, All3Media International’s managing director, it is 
more like the pastry (Perdersen, 2008; David Graham and Associates, 1999: 38).  
 
France: Le fait du Prince 
The British process of broadcasting policy making is conversational in character. 
Once the Bill was published, the government not only listened to representations 
from various organizations but amended the legislation according to the new 
evidence it had received. This dialogic element has been sorely lacking in France, 
as recent policy developments demonstrate. 
French presidents have always kept a close eye on television, and so far 
President Nicolas Sarkozy has not failed tradition (Kuhn, 2010, 1995; Chalaby, 
2002). Like his predecessors, Sarkozy has taken major policy decisions primarily 
based on his very own political needs. The reform of public service broadcasting 
that he initiated in winter 2008 and that was approved after a long dissent by the 
Parliament in February 2009, provides a case in point. The head of France 
Télévisions, the public service broadcaster, is no longer independently appointed 
by the Conseil Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel (CSA), the French regulatory body, but 
by the President himself (nominally the Cabinet).
14
 In addition, since January 
2009, all the channels controlled by France Télévisions have had to stop 
broadcasting commercials during prime time, an interim measure that precedes a 
complete ban in 2011.
15
 At the stroke of a pen, the public broadcaster has lost 
€834 million in advertising revenue, and as it has had several calls for a TV 
licence fee increase turned down by Sarkozy, it will never retrieve most of this 
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income (The Economist, 2008: 78).  
It is generally accepted that this reform allowed Sarkozy to kill two birds with 
one stone: he has asserted his control over the public broadcaster while doing a 
favour for commercial broadcasters by easing the competition for advertising 
revenue.
16
 No consultation with the industry was ever possible, because the 
process would have uncovered the political nature of the motives behind the 
reform. But this leaves the French television industry exposed to a series of 
unforeseen effects which have the potential to inflict lasting damage. It is already 
certain that it represents a huge loss of income for the independent production 
sector, which relied on France Télévisions for many of its commissioned work. In 
turn, this will weaken the country’s capacity to produce content of an international 
standard and may well lead to further deterioration of French TV exports. 
 
English language 
Another advantage that plays in favour of Britain is the English language, which 
is the international TV industry’s official tongue. Michel Rodrigue, the chief 
executive of Distraction Formats, a Montreal-based formats distribution company 
offers a revealing anecdote: his company, which is Quebecan, signs contracts in 
English in France because that is the language the TV executives are used to 
working with there (Rodrigue, 2008). When showcasing programmes at market 
fairs such as MipCom or MipTV, non-English producers dub or sub-title the 
pilots. And since television buyers only acquire what they understand, Rodrigue 
confirms that ‘[n]on-English formats are a much harder sell’ because ‘[p]eople 
can’t look at something and understand it straight away’ (in Esposito, 2008: 19). 
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English is by far the most widely spoken second language in the European 
Union, and the gap in popularity between it and other second languages is 
continuously increasing (European Commission, 2007). Thus British production 
houses have discovered that their finished programmes – in addition to their 
formats – sell increasingly well in Europe in a growing number of genres. Among 
others, Jeremy Clarkson and Gok Wan have become big stars in the European 
countries where the British (and original) versions of Top Gear (BBC 
Worldwide), How To Look Good Naked (RDF Rights) and Miss Naked Beauty 
(All3Media International) have aired (Jarvis, 2008; Pedersen, 2008). 
The widespread use of English means that Anglo-American culture has 
become Europe’s default transnational culture. Any band singing outside their 
country of origin in their native tongue would be noticed for expressing 
themselves in their local language. But Depeche Mode singing in English 
anywhere in Europe is just plain Depeche Mode. Conversely, the fact that an ever 
smaller number of Europeans learn a language other than English means that their 
exposure to other cultures is limited. Thus Europeans’ lack of acquaintance with 
French culture is making the exportation of French TV channels and programmes 
ever more difficult. A few years ago, a French TV company began exporting 
Match TV, a station modeled on the popular weekly magazine, Paris Match, 
which features French film stars and entertainment celebrities. After a few 
months, the company management realized that with a few exceptions these good 
people were totally unknown outside France and withdrew Match TV from 
European cable networks (Rouxel, 2002; 2005). 
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London’s Cosmopolitanism 
As seen above, London has become Europe’s media hub. So what is so attractive 
about the British capital? Alongside New York, it is one of the world’s largest 
financial centres, ‘ahead of the others by a large margin’ (The Economist, 2007: 
6). The proximity of the City facilitates access to capital for the media companies 
that would be unable to develop without this source of investment. London is also 
home to a large media industry and provides a tight network of companies that 
can deliver services ranging from equipment hire and post-production to 
recruiting and legal affairs (see also Scott, 2005).  
London attracts talent from all over Europe and its uniquely diversified labour 
market is a rich reservoir of skills, providing media companies with all their 
employment needs, from finance directors to part-time translators of exotic 
languages. Above all, London is a world city with a unique cosmopolitan culture 
that is a spur to creativity. In a report commissioned by the British government, a 
think tank argues that London has become a ‘global creative powerhouse’ because 
it belongs to ‘a society that has become more open, diverse and plural, spawning a 
depth of cognitive diversity which is at the heart of creativity’ (The Work 
Foundation, 2007: 18). The authors cite the values of tolerance, openness, ‘the 
early embrace of democratic institutions’, and even ‘overseas expansion’ as 
reasons why London and the UK ‘have been more ready to accommodate 
“difference” and thus the creativity that springs from it’ (ibid.).  
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From a trading culture to trade in culture 
The advantages offered by the English language point to a further potential 
explanation of Britain’s cultural primacy in Europe: history. Is Britain’s 
contemporary dominance of European culture a legacy of its Empire?  
Britain was the 19
th
 century’s dominant world power, and the legacy of this 
period includes the globalization of English, Britain’s position at the heart of 
world trade and the global financial system, and the Commonwealth (Ferguson, 
2004). The cultural ties among countries of the Commonwealth (chiefly Australia, 
New Zealand, Canada, and India), alongside the United States, have definitively 
benefited the British TV industry and, as seen above, these countries are key 
import and export markets for British broadcasters and producers.  
Then, there is the nature itself of the British Empire. Contemporary historians 
have begun to argue that what lied at the heart of this Empire was not territorial 
conquest but trade. ‘[T]he fact remains, writes Niall Ferguson, that no 
organization in history has done more to promote the free movement of goods, 
capital and labour than the British Empire in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries’ (2004: xxii). Britain relied on its naval supremacy to protect 
international trade routes and London became the hub of the international trade 
system:  
 
Foreign trade and the Navy therefore formed two elements of a single 
symbiotic system […]. The Navy protected trade and protected the country. 
Trade generated the seamen to man the Navy, and the money to pay for it. 
Overseas possessions had a subordinate role in this system, as sources of 
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trade, but only in atypical years of the mid-century did the British become 
obsessed with colonies for their own sake, and the debacle of the American 
War cured them of that. The eighteenth-century British were not keeping up a 
Navy to conquer a colonial empire. Integrally involved with the international 
trade system was the financial system. Few of Britain’s overseas trades 
balanced by themselves, but the system as a whole was balanced by bills 
exchanged on London: a massive and complex system of international credit 
payments. Combined with banking, brokerage and insurance, it made London 
the centre of a financial empire which earned large sums in ‘invisible’ trade, 
and articulated the national and international trading system’ (Rodger, 2004: 
580). 
 
‘Trade, not territory, adds N.A.M Rodger, was the key to Britain’s prosperity’ 
(2004: 573), and trade, not ideology, is the key to Britain’s dominance of the 
European TV marketplace. Other empires, including France’s, laid emphasis on 
territorial possession and cultural integration, but trade has helped British elites 
understand the potential benefits of commerce in culture. In other words, a trading 
culture has helped foster a trade in culture. Unlike their French – and European - 
counterparts, British politicians have swept aside the hoggartian doubts of the 
intelligentsia to firmly place the market at the heart of the media industries. 
Culture, successive British governments have grasped, is not sacred but a 
commodity that can be exchanged for profit.  
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Conclusion: a culture fit for export 
More than any other European nation, Britain produces a culture fit for export. 
Commercial culture – as this is what it is - is despised by continental cultural and 
political elites because they prefer cultural genres that they perceive as superior 
(Bourdieu 1979). In France, for instance, when TF1 planned to lodge the 
contestants of Star Academy, a talent show, in the upmarket Marais district in 
Paris, local residents went up in arms and petitioned the broadcaster. The show, 
writes Adam Sage, is ‘detested by the intelligentsia, who see it as the 
Americanisation of France’s lofty cultural tradition’ (Sage, 2008). By way of 
contrast, it was revealed that Gordon Brown and his family are allegedly keen 
viewers of The X Factor. So keen was the British Prime Minister that he ‘has been 
bombarding contestants […] with missives urging them to rebel against Simon 
Cowell’s strictures’ (Sherwin, 2008). 
Many analysts object to the reduction of culture to its exchange value, 
claiming for instance that the British government is pursuing a ‘neo-liberal 
agenda’ (Friedman, 2003: 27). True as it may be, it is easy to overlook the 
positive aspects of commercial culture: it is democratic in character because it is 
accessible to all – including prime ministers – and when exported it has a positive 
impact on the nation’s balance of payment. Trade, in culture as in other sectors, 
entails that an exchange is taking place between two actors. But is any exchange 
taking place when a nation tries to impose its culture upon others, or when a social 
class uses culture to distinguish itself from the masses? 
The British broadcasting policy has the merit of being adapted to the global 
media order and enables British media companies to thrive among international 
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media conglomerates. Too many nations, France included, still adopt cultural 
policies that are framed in the mould of national identity. They see international 
television as a way of expanding the nation’s electronic boundaries and promoting 
a national perspective. But they fail to grasp that in the era of transnational 
capitalism, what is at stake is trade, not ideology. 
 
 32 
References 
Baker, S. (1988) ‘Go-go for the dodo’, Cable and Satellite Europe, November 
1988: 34-6. 
Barrett, S. (2008) ‘Global shifts offer new opportunities for UK media’, 
MediaWeek, 19 February 2009: 23. 
BBC Worldwide (2008) Annual Review 2007/08. London. 
Bourdieu, P. (1979) La Distinction: Critique sociale du jugement. Paris: Minuit. 
Brzoznowski, K. (2009) ‘Focus on Chris Bonney’, Worldscreen Weekly, 5 March 
2009. 
Chalaby, J. (2002) The de Gaulle Presidency and the Media: Statism and Public 
Communications. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Chalaby, J. (2009) Transnational Television in Europe: Reconfiguring Global 
Communications Networks. London: I.B. Tauris. 
Clark, R. (2008) Senior Executive Vice President, Entertainment and Production, 
Worldwide Entertainment, FremantleMedia, interview with author, 11 September 
2008. 
Collins, R. (1992) Satellite Television in Western Europe, rev. edn. London: John 
Libbey. 
Daswani, M. (11 January 2008) ‘France 24 Responds to Sarkozy Proposals’, 
Worldscreen.com, 
http://worldscreen.com/newscurrent.php?filename=Sarkozy011108.htm, 
consulted August 2008. 
Daswani, M. (28 April 2009) ‘Nordic Expansion for Shine Group’, 
Worldscreen.com, http://worldscreen.com/articles/display/20760, consulted 
 33 
August 2009. 
David Graham and Associates (1999) Building a global audience: British 
television in overseas markets. London: DCMS. 
Dibble, D. (2007) ‘Foreign boom changing Premier kick-off times’, Daily Mail, 6 
November 2007. 
van Diepen, L. (2008) Head of Acquisitions, Endemol, interview with author, 24 
October 2008. 
Durrani, A. (2008) ‘OMD scoops £650m Renault-Nissan European account’, 
MediaWeek, 4 November 2008: 3. 
The Economist (15 September 2007) ‘Magnets for money – A special report on 
financial centres’: 1-22. 
The Economist, (23 February 2008) ‘French broadcasting: a fuzzy picture’: 78. 
Esposito, M. (2008), ‘UK rides high as exporter of television formats’, Campaign, 
4 April 2008: 19. 
European Commission, (2007) ‘Languages of Europe’, 
<http://ec.europa.eu/education/policies/lang/languages/index_en.html>, consulted 
July 2007. 
Ferguson, N. (2004) Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World. London 
Penguin. 
Freedman, D. (2003) ‘Who Wants To Be a Millionaire? The Politics of Television 
Exports’, Information, Communication & Society, 6(1): 24-41. 
Flynn, B. (1992) ‘Joined at the hip’, Cable and Satellite Europe, November 1992: 
18-20. 
France Télévisions (2008) Rapport annuel 2007. Paris. 
 34 
Goodwin, P. (1998) Television Under the Tories: Broadcasting Policy 1979-1997. 
London: BFI Publishing. 
Hurrell, W. (2009) ‘Export revenues for UK indies near £400m’, Broadcast, 3 
June 2009, http://www.broadcastnow.co.uk?5002079.article, consulted August 
2009. 
ITV (2009) Report and accounts 2008. London. 
Jarvis, C. (2008) Director, Programming & International Format Production, BBC 
Worldwide, interview with author, 23 July 2008. 
Kuhn, R. (1995) The media in France. London: Routledge. 
Kuhn, R. (2010) ‘France: Presidential Assault on the Public Service’, pp. 158-170, 
in P. Iosifidis (ed.) Reinventing Public Service Communication: European 
Broadcasters and Beyond. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Lebailly, P.P. (25 March 2008) ‘France Monde, operating from April’, Rapid TV 
News, http://rapidtvnews.com/index.php/france-monde-operating-from-april.html, 
consulted March 2008. 
O’Carroll, L. ‘The remake of Napoleon’, Cable & Satellite Europe, April 1991: 
20-30. 
McVay, J. (2009) Chief Executive, PACT, interview with author, 25 February 
2009. 
Millichip, J. (2008) Chief Operating Officer, RDF Rights, interview with author, 
14 July 2008. 
Moran, A. (1998) Copycat Television: Globalisation, Program Formats and 
Culture Identity. London: University of Luton Press. 
Moran, A. (2006) Understanding the Global TV Format. Bristol: Intellect. 
 35 
Ofcom (2006) Review of the television production sector – Consultation 
document. London. 
PACT (2002) ‘PACT Submission to ITC Programme Supply Review’; 
http://www.PACT.co.uk/uploads/file_bank/581.pdf, consulted December 2008. 
PACT (2008) Response to Ofcom PSB Review: Phase 1. London. 
Parker, R. (2009) ‘The special relationship’, Broadcast, 5 June 2009: 30-3. 
Pedersen, L. (2008), managing director, All3Media International, interview with 
author, 24 November 2008. 
Reid, A. (2009) ‘Global new-business activity: What’s behind the recent wave of 
international review?’, Campaign, 26 June 2009: 14. 
Rodger, N.A.M. (2004) The Command of the Ocean – A Naval History of Britain 
1649-1815. London: Penguin. 
RDF Media Group (2008) Annual Report & Accounts 2008. London. 
Rouxel, P., vice president, sales and marketing, Lagardère Networks International 
interviews, 13 September 2002 and 6 April 2005. 
Sage, A. (2008) ‘Upmarket district in uproar over reality TV “invastion”’, The 
Times, 20 September 2008: 57. 
Schlesinger, P. (2007) ‘A Cosmopolitan Temptation’, European Journal of 
Communication, 22 (4): 413-26. 
Scott, A. J. (2005) On Holllywood: The Place, The Industry. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Shed Media (2009) Annual Report & Acounts 2008. London. 
Sherwin, A. (2008) ‘Gordon Brown is bitten by the X Factor bug’, The Times, 28 
November 2008: 17. 
 36 
Spencer, G. (2008), director of sales, 2waytraffic, interview with author, 11 July 
2008. 
Television Research Partnership (2004) Rights of Passage: British Television in 
the Global Market. London: British Television Distributors’ Association and UK 
Trade & Investment. 
Television Research Partnership (2008) Rights of Passage 2007. London: PACT. 
Thénard, J.-M. (2008) ‘Sarko tricote des gilets rayés pour TF1’, Le Canard 
Enchaîné, 11 June 2008: 6. 
Tunstall, J. (2009) ‘Big Brother, Peter Bazalgette, and Tim Hincks’, unpublished 
draft paper. 
UK Film Council (2008) 2008 Statistical Yearbook. London. 
The Work Foundation (2007) Staying ahead: the economic performance of the 
UK’s creative industries. London: DCMS. 
                                                 
Acknowledgements 
I gratefully acknowledge support from the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) for providing me with a 
Research Leave Grant that enabled me to write this article. I would also like to express my deep gratitude to all the 
interviewees for their time and cooperation, especially Peter Bazalgette, media consultant; Rob Clark, 
FremantleMedia; Lisette van Diepen, Endemol; Colin Jarvis, BBC Worldwide; John McVay, PACT; Jane Millichip, 
RDF Rights; Louise Pedersen, All3Media International; Philippe Rouxel, Lagardère Networks International, and 
Graham Spencer, 2waytraffic. 
 
Endnotes 
1
 Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, USA, and UK. 
2
 Company sources. 
3
 ‘C21 Formats Lab Weekly’, C21Media.Net, 8 October 2008, available at 
http://www.c21media.net/resources/weekly_detail.asp?id=689, consulted August 2009. 
4
 By way of comparison, France Télévisions’s sales and distribution arm posted €60 million revenue and €4 million 
profit in 2007 (France Télévisions 2008, p. 64). The proportion of this revenue coming from international 
programme sales is unspecified. 
 37 
                                                                                                                                                              
5
 http://www.all3media.com/, consulted December 2008. 
6
 http://www.shinelimited.com/, consulted August 2009. 
7
 http://www.imgworld.com/, consulted December 2008. 
8
 It moved from Cardiff to Llanelli in 1998, a town once famous for its tinplate production (hence the name 
Tinopolis). 
9
 ‘Tinopolis axes TV Corp name’, Broadcast, 5 January 2006, available at 
http://www.broadcastnow.co.uk/news/multi-platform/news/tinopolis-axes-tv-corp-name/154488.article, consulted 
August 2009; ‘Analysis – Profile – Welsh indie mining a rich seam’ Broadcast, 27 January 2005, 
http://www.broadcastnow.co.uk/news/multi-platform/news/analysis-profile-welsh-indie-mining-a-rich-
seam/1019169.article, consulted August 2009; http://www.tinopolis.com/WhoAreWe/Default.aspx, consulted 
August 2009. 
10
 In factual entertainment for instance, it is standard advice to avoid having the presenter speak directly to camera. 
Documentaries with a voice-over cross boundaries far easier than those with a presenter, thus if one must be 
included, it is preferable to film him or her as s/he moves since lip synchronization matters less (Millichip 2008; 
Pedersen 2008). 
11
 Company source. 
12
 It is called a ‘joint’ committee because it brings together Members of the House of Lords and the House of 
Commons, a rare occurrence. 
13
 When a broadcaster acquires a licence for a programme, the price can only include a certain number of uses for a 
specific channel. They can buy other windows for other channels, but they have to be negotiated separately. 
14
 ‘Télévision – La réforme de l’audiovisuel public définitivement adoptée’, LCI.fr (4 February 2009), 
http://tf1.lci.fr/infos/economie/medias/0,4247538,00-la-reforme-de-l-audiovisuel-public-definitevement-adoptee-
.html, consulted August 2009. 
15
 ‘Réforme de l’audiovisuel public : Suppression de la publicité à partir de 20h’, Ministère de la culture, 17 
December 2008, http://www.culture.gouv.fr/culture/actualites/communiq/albanel/reforme-audiovisuel-
public1208.html, consulted August 2009. 
16
 Sarkozy is particularly close to TF1, the leading commercial network, , which is controlled by Martin Bouygues, 
who ‘just happens to be a close friend of Mr Sarkozy’s and godfather to one of his sons’ (The Economist 2008, p. 
78). 
